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NOTES AND COMMENTS
as an unjustified deviation from this judicial attitude, inspired by an over-
exuberance of the period traceable to the New Deal 96 Whether the Kyne
decision is viewed as a correction of an historical aberration, as a result (which
it does not purport to be) dictated by a changed public policy gleaned from
the Administrative Procedure Act,97 or as simply a natural result of the frailty
of the judiciary overzealously guarding its function as the final arbiter of legal
disputes, it is not simply a different situation calling for different results. It
should, in the future, require fundamentally different approaches than have
been utilized in the past. Given reasonably close questions of law, the injunc-
tion proceeding may well be, in practical effect, a necessary step in the certifica-
tion process.
WLLAm H. GAmiDNER
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON FOREIGN DIVORCES: PROOF OF THE
FOREIGN LAW
The expanding industrial complex of the United States and the rapidly
growing mobility of its population, fostered by improvements in the fields of
transportation and communication, have led to increasing limitations on the
traditional independence of the state in areas heretofore considered local in
nature. The Supreme Court, recognizing the need for developing the state court
systems into an integrated judicial framework, has utilized the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as one means of reaching that objective.1
These efforts were bound to raise new problems. Certainly one of the
most sacrosanct local areas is marriage and divorce; local policy governs these
institutions with zeal, and infringements by federal law naturally result in a
great deal of controversy. The advent of the "divorce mill state" created new
resentments which inevitably led to a tenacious grasping of divergent views.
An early attempt to gain order out of the chaos and to adjust the conflicting
interests of the states was doomed to failure.2
The controversy is largely focused on the problem of a sister state's obliga-
tion to enforce the decree of the divorcing state. Since jurisdiction, or power,
is a necessary prerequisite to the giving of full faith and credit to any decree or
judgment, the states searched this area for a weakness upon the basis of which
96. "This decision is in some measure, I believe, an expression of the mood of judicial
self-deprecation and abdication into which the Court of that period had fallen. Haunted
by a past of judicial arrogance, beguiled by the promise of administrative action, a majority
of the judges who participated were easily persuaded of the irrelevance of the judicial role."
Id. at 430.
97. Air Line Dispatchers Association v. National Mediation Board, 189 F.2d 685
(D.C.Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). See supra note 25.
1. EmEzwzso, CoNczmrs oF LAWS, part one, p. 17.
2. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 Sup.Ct. 525 (1906).
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they could deny full faith and credit and sustain their own local policy. The
weakness was apparent in the very basis of divorce jurisdiction, domicile.
Domicile, an ill-defined and "elusive" concept, the sacred cow of divorce
jurisdiction, is an increasingly unacceptable basis of reference. The governing
standard as to, or definition of, domicile varies. The courts of one state may
weigh heavily the intent stated by the person,3 the courts of another state may
place emphasis on the intent as manifested by conduct.4 Both tests may be
constitutionally acceptable but the conceptual differences vary the conclusion.
A common element in the concept is some sort of intent, and the subjectivity
of that intent results in additional variance.
II
The Supreme Court in a series of five cases has indicated the manner in
which the local interests of the states will be reconciled with the requirements
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Williams v. State of North Carolina (1)r established conclusively that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause compels recognition of valid divorce decrees be-
tween states. The basis of the compulsion is the inherent right of each state
to determine the marriage status of a spouse domiciled there even though the
other spouse be absent, provided the form and nature of substitued service meet
due process requirements. The power of the divorcing state rests upon its con-
trol over marriage and divorce within its borders. This holding left in doubt
the extent to which a sister state might avoid giving full faith and credit by
finding no domicile and, hence, no jurisdiction.
Williams v. State of North Carolina (11)6 resolved this question in part.
The Court recognized that domicile, being the basis of jurisdiction, is necessary
to give a valid divorce decree, and held that the domiciliary state of the absentee
spouse may apply its own test of domicile with regard to that state's interests.
The Court accompanied the holding with this caveat:
The challenged judgment must, however, satisfy our scrutiny that
the reciprocal duty of respect owed by the states to one another's ad-
judication has been fairly discharged, and has not been evaded under
the guise of finding an absence of domicile and a want of power in the
court rendering the judgment.
This might have seemed at the time to be a sufficient answer to the prob-
lem. However, in the area of domestic relations the Supreme Court may well
have discovered that its caveat was grossly inadequate to meet the problem.
Modification would be necessary to avoid the impossible task of policing the
caveat.
3. In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J.Eq. 268, 170 Ad. 601 (1934).
4. In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 At. 303 (1932).
5. 317 U.S. 287, 63 Sup.Ct. 207 (1942).
6. 325 U.S. 226, 65 Sup.Ct. 1092 (1945).
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In Sherrer v. Sherrer7 the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause by holding that it barred the defendant spouse from
attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister
state "... . where the defendant has been afforded full opportunity to contest
the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such col-
lateral attack in the courts of the state which rendered the decree." The court
restated the pervading policy behind the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to weld
the states into a nation, and noted the hardships that unwarranted collateral
attacks might inflict on a litigant.
Obviously, this case, while expanding the res judicata effect of a foreign
divorce decree and to some extent modifying the second Williams case, is not
inconsistent with the theory underlying domicile. The appearance and contest
by the defendant may result in estoppel in the rendering state; if so, the other
states must also hold the defendant estopped from attacking the decree col-
laterally.
However, Johnson v. Muelberger8 went further. In this case a divorce
granted after a purely formal appearance and contest (decrees rendered on this
basis are often referred to as "consent decrees") by the defendant spouse was
attacked by a stranger to the divorce action, and the Supreme Court held that
such collateral attack was forbidden under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
unless permitted in the rendering state. This holding was in the face of facts
proving that the parties to the divorce had committed a fraud on the rendering
court as to domicile. In the words of the court:
When a divorce cannot be attacked for lack of jurisdiction by
parties before the court or strangers in the rendering state, it cannot
be attacked anywhere in the union. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
forbids.
This extension is difficult to explain on the basis of the res judicata effect of a
judgment and seemed to mark a departure from a strictly domicile basis of
jurisdiction. Local policy again gave way before the overriding policy toward
unity.
The impact of this case was heavy; husband and wife were now enabled
to collaborate in committing a fraud on the court of a divorce-mill state whose
laws minimized the opportunities for collateral attack and thus to secure a
divorce, conceptually void but unassailable. If viewed as a departure from the
traditional concept of domicile as the basis of divorce jurisdiction in the situa-
tion where both parties appear and "consent" to the divorce this result does not
seem to be untenable. It tends to insure uniform treatment of the decree and
to eliminate the danger of collateral attack whenever the laws of the divorcing
state preclude it, ending threats of attack against the estates of the parties, of
bigamy, of bastardy, etc. In effect, a few escape the consequences of failure to
7. 334 U.S. 343, 68 Sup.Ct. 1087 (1947).
8. 340 U.S. 581, 71 Sup.Ct. 474 (1951).
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meet at least formal requirements, but the majority, complying with these
minimal requirements, are no longer subject to harassment on the basis of
domicile.
The final case in the series, Cook v. Cook,9 reinforced the policy under-
lying the Johnson case by establishing that a divorce decree gives rise to a pre-
sumption of jurisdiction over both parties. The language of the case hints at
what is apparently a cbmpromise between the trend toward national uniformity
on the one hand, and respect for local interests, on the other. When an ex parte
divorce comes under judicial scrutiny in the domicile of the absentee spouse,
the jurisdictional finding of domicile may be re-examined within the limits laid
down by Williams II. Thus, the innocent spouse is protected from a sister
state's divorce decree which fails to satisfy the domiciliary standards of his or
her home state. However, where both parties have appeared, domicile as a
jurisdictional fact is completely withdrawn from re-examination if the law of
the rendering state insulates the decree from such attack, and further, the
"burden of undermining the decree rests heavily upon the assailant."'1 Real-
istically, this is the substitution of personal jurisdiction for domicile as a juris-
dictional prerequisite and an implied recognition that marriage, at least in this
situation, may be treated as a personal relationship which is beyond the control
of the domiciliary state or states."
In view of this extraordinary protection given to "consent decrees" it is
particularly appropriate to examine the limitation on this protection and the
conditions under which it will be afforded. It will be recalled that, according to
the Johnson case, a stranger's right collaterally to attack is determined by the
law of the divorcing court. In many cases this right may clearly appear from
the divorcing State's law; the determination of the sister state's law becomes a
problem when it is not clearly established in the sister state. In dealing with
this right to assail the decree, it is appropriate to note that the reference to the
"heavy burden on the assailant" in Williams II was concerned with the quantum
of proof necessary to upset the decree of a sister state and not with the status
of the attacking party.
III
In a court's search for the divorcing state's law on the subject of a
stranger's standing to attack its divorce, the re-examining court may follow one
of two alternatives. First, it may treat the problem as it would any other
problem involving the proof of foreign law. Second, it may, in view of the
sensitivity of the subject, treat the problem as sui generis.
If treated as problem of proof of foreign law three methods may be em-
ployed with varying results. First, the examining state may take judicial notice
9. 342 U.S. 126, 72 Sup.Ct. 157 (1951).
10. Williams v. North Carolina (II), supra note 6.
11. See EmHazwzwEi, op. cit. supra note 1 at 247; see also, Stimson's Jurisdiction in
Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222 (March 1956).
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of the sister state's law. Second, the examining state in absence of contrary
proof may presume the sister state's law to be the same as her own common law.
Third, the examining state may place the burden of proving his standing upon
the assailant.
Many states by statute require or at least authorize judicial notice of the
divorcing sister state's law.' 2 Unfortunately, judicial notice does not provide an
answer where an assailant's standing to attack the decree is not clear. Any
attempted resolution would have to be justified on other principles.
Under the general rule of conflicts that in the absence of proof of a sister
state's common law it will be presumed to be the same as the forum's own
common law, the decision is in effect determined by local law.13 As a result a
divorce decree rendered in a state whose law as to attack by third parties is
unclear may be assailable in one sister state but free from attack in another.
This undesirable result is avoided, of course, if the assailant predicates his right
upon a foreign statute.14 He bears the burden of proving his right under that
statute; if proof of that statute fails no alternative reference is available.
It is submitted that by placing the burden of proof on the assailant when-
ever his standing is in doubt the result could be made to conform more closely
to the policy underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause and at the same time
prevent inconsistent rulings based on variance in local law. In other words, an
attack would be limited to a situation where the plaintiff can clearly establish
his right to assail the decree; this right would not vary from state to state and
the parties would be less subject to harassment.
Professor Ehrenzweig' 5 suggests that the general attitude of the forum as
to "consent divorce decrees" will govern the result. He does not think the
principle that the burden "rests heavily on the assailant" to be applicable, nor
does he believe on the other hand that the defendant should necessarily bear
the affirmative on this issue. Apparently it is Professor Ehrenzweig's view that
the general principles concerning proof of sister state law will not be followed,
but that the dilemma will be resolved ad hoc on the basis of the forum's atti-
tudes toward divorce. It is suggested, however, that such a result would seem
to undermine the trend of the Supreme Court decisions toward uniformity of
result and finality of decrees.
IV
The states have not as yet had the opportunity to develop a significant body
of law with respect to the problem of determination of an assailant's right under
12. Cf. Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, 9A U.L.A. (1957) 318; Uniform
Proof of Statutes Act, 9B U.LA. (1957) 399.
13. Cherwein v. Cherwein, 272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E.2d 185 (1936); Davis v. Davis, 119
Conn. 194, 175 Ad. 574 (1934); Miller v. United States Fidelity and Casualty Co., 291
Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935); see also, 3 BEAL, TnE Co'N cT oF LAWS 1682 (1935).
14. Venner v. N.Y. Central & Hudson R.R. Co., 160 App.Div. 127, 145 N.Y.S. 725
(3d Dep't 1914), af'd, 217 N.Y. 615, 111 N.E. 487 (1916) (decided prior to the enactment
of §344 of the Civil Practice Act).
15. E=NzwEiG, op. cit. supra note 1 at 248.
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the law of the rendering state collaterally to attack a divorce decree. In one
New York and two Illinois cases however, the courts have faced the problem
and have reached different conclusions. In a recent New York case a woman's
divorce was attacked by her second husband by way of defense to her separation
suit.10 The parties to the first divorce, in procuring a Georgia divorce decree,
had fraudulently misrepresented their domicile. New York has a statute au-
thorizing its courts to take judicial notice of a sister state's law.17 Each party
had a Georgia lawyer testify as to the Georgia law on collateral attack, but their
testimony was conflicting; and the judge was unable to resolve this conflict by
his own analysis of the available Georgia decisions. The court described its
dilemma and its resolution in these terms:
In the circumstances, I am driven to making a choice between vir-
tually negating the Johnson ruling by holding that the instant attack
is permissible, for it has not been clearly established that the divorce
state would prohibit it, or of broadening the scope of the Johnson
case by requiring the assailant to prove that the state which rendered
the decree would permit the attack by him. I see no middle or other
ground. I have come to the conclusion that the proper view is the lat-
ter-that the burden should be placed upon one wlo would assail the
decree of a sister state to prove that, under the laws of that state, he
would be permitted to attack the decree. That view, I think, is more
in keeping with the command of the constitution, and it finds support
in the language of the opinions--albeit not in the definitive decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. (Emphasis added.)
Professor Ehrenzweig might well point to this holding as suggesting New York's
inclination toward accepting "consent" as a sufficient basis for divorce juris-
diction.'8 However, whatever support he may derive from this decision, recent
Illinois decisions do not seem to bear him out. They hold without further dis-
cussion, that the law of the divorcing state concerning the right to attack col-
laterally will be presumed, in absence of contrary proof, to be the same as that
of Illinois.' 9 In other words, they simply treated the problem as one of proof
of foreign law. As it happened, Illinois law foreclosed such an attack. It can
hardly be argued that had Illinois law allowed such collateral attack the court's
approach to the solution of the problem would have been different.
Is a policy of the individual states to look to their own common law to
determine standing to attack a consent decree, consistent with the trend estab-
lished by the Supreme Court decisions?
The faith and credit is not to be niggardly but generous, full.
Local policy must at times be required to give way, such is part of the
price of our federal system. 0
16. Phillips v. Phillips, - Misc.2d-, 180 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup.Ct. 1958).
17. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §344a, subdv.B.
18. New York Courts by statutory authority grant divorces regardless of place of
domicile if the marriage was solemnized in New York. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §1147.
19. In re Day's Estate, 7 Ill.2d 350, 131 N.E.2d 50 (1956); Jamison v. Jamison,
14 IllApp.2d 233, 144 N.E.2d 540 (1957).
20. Johnson v. Muelberger, supra note 8.
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Uniformity of result is achieved by avoiding auxiliary reference to domestic
law in this situation, and harassment is less likely as the divorcing court's
decree gains stability. It is submitted that the Supreme Court may find these
considerations of sufficient weight to justify placing on the assailant the burden
of proving his right collaterally to attack a divorce decree.
BERYL McGum=
